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 THE RISE AND FALL OF THE 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION: 
THE TORTUOUS PATH FROM 
REGULATION TO DEREGULATION OF 
AMERICA’S INFRASTRUCTURE 
PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY* 
INTRODUCTION 
For a thousand years from its dedication in 360 A.D., 
Constantinople’s Hagia Sofia was the largest building in the world.  As 
the first Christian Emperor, Constantine had ordered pagan temples 
pillaged and leveled.  Several of Hagia Sofia’s stones thus were taken 
from a nearby Roman temple, which itself had borrowed stones from an 
earlier Greek temple on the same site.  Indeed, as Vikings found 
themselves in the city during the middle of this time period, some 
graffiti may attest to a worship of Norse gods.  Hagia Sofia was a 
Christian cathedral until 1453, when the invading Ottoman Turks 
converted it to an Islamic mosque.  In 1935, it was converted into a 
secular museum.  So in today’s Istanbul, various generations in turn 
worshiped Greek gods, Roman gods, a Christian God, and a Moslem 
God—to say nothing of the Norse gods—on the same hallowed ground.  
Today, as a museum, Hagia Sophia is no longer a place of worship of 
any god.   
As we shall see with respect to regulation of the transportation 
industry, succeeding generations worship different economic gods as 
well.  Building upon principles of Roman law, English courts, beginning 
in the Middle Ages, imposed upon “common carriers” special duties to 
serve all without discrimination and with strict liability for loss and 
damage to goods in their care.1  In 1887, the U.S. government 
 
* Tomlinson Professor of Global Governance in Air & Space Law and Director of the 
Institute of Air & Space Law, McGill University.  The author was an Attorney-Advisor 
(1975–1977) and Legal Advisor to the Chairman (1981–1982) of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. 
1. Jurgen Basedow, Common Carriers—Continuity and Disintegration in U.S. 
Transportation Law, 13 TRANSP. L.J. 1, 3 (1983). 
1152 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:1151 
established the first independent regulatory agency, the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (“ICC” or “Commission”), and would grant it 
jurisdiction to regulate the rates and practices of the railroads.  
Currently, several federal agencies, including the Surface 
Transportation Board, the Federal Maritime Commission, the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, and the Department of 
Transportation, regulate rail, motor, air, and water carriage, as well as 
pipelines and freight forwarders.  Despite substantive differences 
between the kind and scope of regulation by the various agencies, each 
mode of transportation is in the business of moving passengers or 
commodities from one point to another.2 
But the policy objectives driving transportation regulation have 
changed significantly since 1887.  Congress initially instituted regulation 
under the ICC largely to protect the public from the monopolistic 
abuses of the railroads.  Between 1920 and 1975, however, the goal of 
the national transportation policy shifted to protection of the 
transportation industry from the deleterious consequences of 
unconstrained competition.  Then, just as market failure had given rise 
to economic regulation, regulatory failure gave rise to deregulation.3  
Thus, in the last quarter of the twentieth century and into the twenty-
first, regulatory policy has sought to stimulate competition in order to 
enhance consumer welfare.  Managed competition across a number of 
infrastructure industries was jettisoned in favor of market Darwinism.  
Transportation, as the first major industry to be regulated and, nearly a 
century later, the first to be deregulated, has been at the forefront of this 
dramatic (r)evolution in economic policy. 
In short, the transportation industry has been a great sea upon which 
the relationship between government and the market has ebbed and 
flowed over time, with various aspects of laissez-faire, regulation, 
managed competition, subsidization, and socialism cast upon it during 
several historical periods. 
 
2. The differences in regulation reflect the inherent economic differences among the 
modes of transportation, the legislative history of the regulation, the language of the specific 
statutory provisions, the philosophical and political composition of the individuals serving on 
the regulatory commissions, and the role of the judiciary in either circumscribing or 
encouraging regulatory activity. 
3. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated 
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1397–1403 (1998); Paul Stephen Dempsey, Market 
Failure and Regulatory Failure as Catalysts for Political Change: The Choice Between 
Imperfect Regulation and Imperfect Competition, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 13–35 (1989). 
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This Article surveys some of the historical, political, economic, and 
public policy forces that have been catalysts for regulation and 
deregulation.  In Constantinople (now Istanbul) and a hundred other 
national capitals, it is common for young generations to ignore the 
lessons of history and conclude that their ancestors got it wrong. 
I.  THE WORLD BEFORE THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 
As Adam Smith was penning The Wealth of Nations, America was 
casting off mercantilism with its Revolution of 1776 against King George 
III.  With the adoption of the U.S. Constitution in 1787, America would 
embrace laissez-faire to the point of permitting slavery.  A century later, 
America would change course again.  Some of the intervening time 
merits comment. 
A.  The Robber Barons 
Along Europe’s Rhine River stand a number of medieval castles, 
testament to the German robber barons who built them.  The Rhine was 
a principal highway of commerce for medieval Europe.  The barons 
would exact a toll from all the barge traffic on the river, with the 
enforcement mechanism of sinking the barges that would not pay.  The 
toll would be set at whatever the market would bear.  In nineteenth-
century America, a new group of robber barons emerged; they, too, 
would attempt to gain control of the transportation network and exact a 
toll from all who passed. 
Cornelius Vanderbilt, who began the string of consolidations that led 
to intensive competition among the railroads, is an important and 
illustrative example. Although steamboats had made Vanderbilt the 
richest man in the nation, between 1857 and 1862 he sold his steamboat 
interests and began buying railroads.  He noted that, in 1860, 30,000 
miles of rail were carrying seventy percent of the freight, but that this 
was segmented among scores of small firms.  For instance, if a passenger 
wanted to travel from New York to Chicago, he would have to change 
trains seventeen times, from one small line to another.  By 1868, 
Vanderbilt had consolidated a number of smaller railroads into the New 
York Central Railroad, allowing a passenger to travel from New York 
to Chicago without changing trains and with transit time reduced from 
fifty hours to twenty-four.4 
 
4. Vanderbilt captured the old New York Central (running from Albany to Buffalo) by 
refusing to connect its passengers or freight with his lines at Albany.  The Central capitulated, 
selling the line to Vanderbilt, who amalgamated his lines into the New York Central trunk 
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Others followed Vanderbilt’s lead, and three additional railroads 
soon competed between New York and Chicago—the Pennsylvania, the 
Baltimore and Ohio, and the Erie.  Without sufficient traffic to support 
multiple lines, competition became intense.  Large shippers served by 
more than a single railroad enjoyed special low rates, under-billing, and, 
in some instances, rebates, occasionally even on the shipment of 
competitors’ traffic.5 
One example of the rate wars was that practiced between the New 
York Central and Erie railroads.  After a series of price wars, which 
brought the price of moving cattle from Chicago to New York down to 
$1.00 a car, Jim Fisk, president of the Erie, bought all the cattle 
available and shipped them aboard Vanderbilt’s New York Central.6 
 
line, running from the seaboard to the Great Lakes.  MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER 
BARONS: THE GREAT AMERICAN CAPITALISTS, 1861–1901, at 71 (1962). 
 It is said that Vanderbilt was worth $11 million in 1853 but $105 million upon his death in 
1877.  Id. at 13–14.  The steamboat-to-railroad switch was not the first instance of the 
adaptability that enabled him to accumulate such a fortune.  As a master of sailing vessels, 
Vanderbilt lamented paddle wheelers, which had been introduced in 1807; and when the 
latter proved their value in transporting passengers, Vanderbilt insisted that they could never 
be used for freight “because the machinery would take up too much room.”  Id. at 13.  But 
when this prediction proved incorrect, Vanderbilt had the best steamboats built for his lines 
and became a dominant player.  Id. at 13–14.  By the 1850s, he had more than 100 vessels 
afloat.  Id.  
5. W.D. Brewer, Regulation—The Balance Point, 1 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 355, 366 
(1974).  For example, on shipments of oil from western Pennsylvania to Cleveland, John 
D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil received a forty-cent rebate on every barrel it shipped, plus 
another forty cents per barrel shipped by its competitors.  Standard Oil would also receive 
comprehensive information about the oil shipped by its competitors, proprietary information 
that was invaluable in underpricing them.  One biographer described the rebates as “an 
instrument of competitive cruelty unparalleled in industry.”  RON CHERNOW, TITAN: THE 
LIFE OF JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, SR. 136 (1998) (quoting JOHN T. FLYNN, MEN OF WEALTH 
444 (1941)).  Such rebates were, indeed, one of the means by which Rockefeller managed to 
take over the refineries in Cleveland that competed with Standard Oil and, eventually, to 
establish a national monopoly.  HENRY W. BRAGDON & SAMUEL P. MCCUTCHEN, HISTORY 
OF A FREE PEOPLE 391–92 (1967).  According to John’s brother, Frank, the message was, “If 
you don’t sell your property to us it will be valueless, because we have got the advantage with 
the railroads.”  JOSEPHSON, supra note 4, at 119.  At the turn of the century, Yale President 
Arthur Hadley observed that “the railroad is not merely an instrument fostering monopoly; it 
is itself an example of the tendency of monopoly.  Railroad consolidation has put the control 
of the country’s business into the hands of a few large corporations.”  ARTHUR TWINING 
HADLEY, RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION: ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAWS 21 (1903).  “The 
public sees no limit to the growing power of corporations, and it regards this growth with a 
kind of vague fear.”  Id. at 42. 
6. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation Deregulation—On a Collision Course?, 13 
TRANSP. L.J. 329, 334 (1984); see also Oren Harris, Symposium on the Interstate Commerce 
Commission—Introduction, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 5 (1962) (alluding to rate wars 
involving shipment of cattle in the 1860s). 
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Rate wars in competitive markets drove down profits, leading 
carriers to raise prices to shippers without alternative means of 
transport.  Often, a farmer located along an intermediate point served 
by only a single railroad would find that the price he was charged to ship 
his grain to market was higher than that charged to another shipper, 
even though that other farmer’s grain would be moved a longer distance 
over the same line.7  Hence, pricing in this era was highly discriminatory.  
Prices were generally low, but unstable, between points served by 
competing railroads or having access to navigable waterways, and 
relatively high (and even extortionate) at points between which shippers 
had no alternative means of transport.8  Pricing began to reflect the level 
of competition in any market, rather than the cost of providing service.  
Moreover, preferred shippers enjoyed special rates, under-billing, and 
rebates.9 
All of this occurred in an era prior to the existence of the antitrust 
laws.  Ruinous rate wars, often of a predatory nature, designed to drive 
 
7. Transportation rates from location points that a single rail carrier served were 
significantly higher than those rates charged at points where railroad competition existed.  
This was true even though points in the former group were often closer to the ultimate 
destination.  For example, it cost more to ship goods from Poughkeepsie to New York City on 
the only line available, the New York Central Railroad, than to ship goods from Chicago to 
New York City, where both the Pennsylvania and Erie Railroads competed with the New 
York Central Railroad.  BRAGDON & MCCUTCHEN, supra note 5, at 427.  Indeed, 
transportation costs were commonly higher on a shorter haul than on a longer haul even on 
the same line in the same direction.  Price competition among carriers serving common 
geographical points led to rampant rate wars.  Carriers handled many shipments at substantial 
losses in hopes of forcing other carriers out of business, thereby enabling the victorious 
carrier to serve the particular location point on its own terms.  Paul Stephen Dempsey, Rate 
Regulation and Antitrust Immunity in Transportation: The Genesis and Evolution of This 
Endangered Species, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 335, 339 (1983). 
8. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., A PROSPECTUS FOR CHANGE IN THE FREIGHT RAILROAD 
INDUSTRY 116 (1978) [hereinafter PROSPECTUS FOR CHANGE]. 
9. For example, Standard Oil had a “secret agreement with the railroads running out of 
Cleveland by which the rates on its products would be 25 to 50 percent below those charged 
other companies.”  BRAGDON & MCCUTCHEN, supra note 5, at 391–92.  John D. Rockefeller 
admitted:  
A public rate was made and collected by the railroad companies, but so far as my 
knowledge extends, was seldom retained in full; a portion of it was repaid to the 
shipper as a rebate.  By this method the real rate of freight which any shipper paid 
was not known by his competitors, nor by other railroads, the amount being a 
matter of bargain with the carrying companies. 
JOSEPHSON, supra note 4, at 113.  Railroad rebates “hastened the shift toward an integrated 
national economy, top-heavy with giant companies enjoying preferential freight rates.”  
CHERNOW, supra note 5, at 115. 
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competitors out of business, were interspersed with price fixing and 
pooling agreements, whereby carriers in competitive markets would 
agree to raise prices and pool revenue and freight, whereupon rates 
soared.10 
B.  Political Corruption, Financial Piracy, and Discrimination 
The enormous concentrations of wealth and power stemming from 
railroading led to political corruption, as railroad entrepreneurs bribed 
legislators and judges, sold them stock at less than fair market value, and 
gave them free passes, so as to avoid taxation and regulation.11  So 
immense were the powers of the American robber barons that they 
became the law unto themselves.  As was said to have been remarked by 
Cornelius Vanderbilt, “What do I care about the law?  Hain’t I got the 
power?”12  Fraud, deceit, and corruption marked the era.13   
Many carriers issued watered stock, manipulating its price up or 
down to make quick profits.  One example involved Cornelius 
Vanderbilt’s attempt to take over the Erie Railroad, which competed 
with Vanderbilt’s New York Central.  The Erie was owned by “the 
sanctimonious and treacherous [Daniel] Drew, the fearless Jim Fisk, 
[and] the impassive, stealthy Jay Gould.”14  They got wind of the 
 
10. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation: A Legal History, 30 TRANSP. L.J. 235, 254 
(2003); see CHARLES LEE RAPER, RAILWAY TRANSPORTATION: A HISTORY OF ITS 
ECONOMICS AND OF ITS RELATION TO THE STATE 207 (1912). 
11. SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 
730–31, 763–64 (1965). 
12. JOSEPHSON, supra note 4, at 72. 
13. A particularly notorious example was the Credit Mobilier scheme.  The New York 
Sun in 1872 labeled Thomas Durant of the Credit Mobilier (through which much of the 
Union Pacific’s public capital flowed) as “The King of Frauds.”  RUSSELL BOURNE, 
AMERICANS ON THE MOVE: A HISTORY OF WATERWAYS, RAILWAYS, AND HIGHWAYS 94 
(1995).  The Sun described “[h]ow the Credit Mobilier bought its way through Congress,” 
listing the “Congressmen who have robbed the People and who now support the National 
Robber.”  Id. at 94–95.  The paper alleged that Durant and his co-conspirators had “gobbled” 
more than $211 million of public money.  Id. at 95.  Well into the twentieth century, it would 
be said that “[t]he Credit Mobilier to which the construction of the Union Pacific was sublet 
at an outrageous profit still smolders as a Sodom and Gomorrah in the desert of financial 
desolation and Congressional venality.”  WINTHROP M. DANIELS, AMERICAN RAILROADS: 
FOUR PHASES OF THEIR HISTORY 45 (1932). 
14. JOSEPHSON, supra note 4, at 74.  Jay Gould subsequently compelled the Union 
Pacific to purchase the inflated stock of rail carriers he controlled—the Kansas Pacific and 
Denver Pacific, both land-grant railroads emptied of their state subsidies and private capital, 
now but “streaks of rust” ending in the desert.  With the Wabash, the St. Joseph & Denver, 
the Missouri Pacific (which he acquired for only $3.8 million even though $25 million had 
been lavished on it in subsidies), and the Missouri, Kansas & Texas also in his portfolio, 
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attempted takeover and began issuing watered stock.15  They had some 
expertise: Drew had prospered in the cattle trade by inaugurating the 
concept of “watered stock,” whereby cattle were kept thirsty throughout 
the journey, then given drink only immediately before they were 
weighed for sale.16 
The Panic of 1873 gave fuel to the fire of wildly fluctuating rates.  
The Panic had been precipitated by the financial failure of James J. Hill, 
the financier of the Northern Pacific.  By the end of the year, nearly 
one-fifth of the nation’s railroad mileage was in bankruptcy.  Rail rate 
competition was intensified by the Panic of 1873 and the long depression 
that followed.17  The rate wars did not subside until 1877.18 
The situation “left almost everyone dissatisfied,” as it would later be 
summarized: 
 
The railroads tried to avoid the constant rate wars, rebates to 
favored shippers, or low rates.  Farmers wanted lower rates and 
protection against discriminatory rate practices.  Shippers in 
 
Gould threatened the Union Pacific that if it did not buy his two parallel railroads, he would 
stretch a competing line all the way to the Pacific Ocean.  Id. at 199–203.  Gould was given 
200,000 shares of the Union Pacific (then worth about $10 million) for the worthless Kansas 
Pacific and Denver Pacific lines.  Id. at 200–01; BOURNE, supra note 13, at 18, 96.  Long 
before, Daniel Drew had said of Gould, “His touch is death.”  JOSEPHSON, supra note 4, at 
201.  There were other instances.  “[I]ts treasury empty, its stock maintained by secret loans at 
a high price—the poor Wabash was to crash in a sensational debacle, in which it appeared 
afterward that Jay Gould was in no way involved.  He was simply not there when it 
happened.”  Id. at 203.  These actions injured both investors and the shipping public, for the 
carriers found it necessary to maintain high rates in order to pay dividends on these inflated 
stock issues.  BRAGDON & MCCUTCHEN, supra note 5, at 427. 
15. Printing Erie stock ferociously to feed Vanderbilt’s insatiable thirst, Fisk said, “If 
this printing press don’t break down, I’ll be damned if I don’t give the old hog all he wants of 
Erie.”  JOSEPHSON, supra note 4, at 126.  Although Vanderbilt himself had issued watered 
stock from time to time, he was taken.  In the ensuing battle over the Erie, both sides bribed 
New York legislators and judges.  As a result of such stock manipulation, “[t]he railroad 
treasury was thus gutted for the benefit of the erstwhile combatants,” and the Erie was unable 
to pay dividends for half a century.  DANIELS, supra note 13, at 21–22. 
16. JOSEPHSON, supra note 4, at 18.  Watering stock was a concept Drew introduced to 
the securities industry as a stockbroker and head of the house of Drew, Robinson & Co. 
17. RAPER, supra note 10, at 206. 
18. The rate wars “brought ruin to the companies, and little advantage to the shippers as 
a whole.  To some shippers it, to be sure, meant low rates.  To others, notably those located at 
the intermediate non-competitive points, it brought the condition of still higher charges for 
transportation service; the chief burden of the maintenance and fixed charges rested upon 
these shippers, in favour of those at the great competitive points.  It was, in fact, during these 
years of intense competition, that abusive discriminations were at their worst.  These were the 
‘dark days’ of the history of the American railways.”  Id. 
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competitive markets wanted greater rate stability and assurances 
that they would not be placed at a competitive disadvantage 
relative to those shipping the same product from the same or 
other origins.19 
 
A widespread interest in regulation thus began to develop. 
 To be sure, some were unhappier than others.  In particular, reaction 
to price discrimination practiced by the railroads became the basis for 
the consumer revolt by the agrarian society formed in 1867 known as the 
National Grange.20  This political movement led a number of state 
legislatures to promulgate laws to regulate the railroads.21 
 
19. PROSPECTUS FOR CHANGE, supra note 8, at 116. 
20. After America’s young men returned to their farms following the Civil War, the 
production of cereal crops increased, and prices fell.  Dempsey, supra note 10, at 260.  
Moreover, rate discrimination, bribery of public officials, and financial piracy became 
widespread.  The “National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry” (a sort of rural freemasons 
society, more commonly known as the Grangers) led the political charge for regulation.  The 
National Grange was a powerful political organization of 1.5 million western farmers banded 
together in 20,000 lodges.  Id. at 260–61.  It would call for regulation of railroads, grain 
elevators, and public warehouses.  See generally GEORGE H. MILLER, RAILROADS AND THE 
GRANGER LAWS (1971).  The desire for economic growth led both the federal and many 
state and local governments to provide economic incentives to railroads to build westward.  
Dempsey, supra note 10, at 261.  In addition to the federal and state land grant incentives, the 
railroad promoters also turned to individuals located along the rights of way for investment 
capital.  Many farmers mortgaged their farms—starry-eyed with the prospect of lucrative 
dividends and reasonably priced access to eastern markets.  However, they were disappointed 
on both counts.  Dividends were poor, or nonexistent.  Many railroads went through 
bankruptcy and reorganization, and the value of their stock was wiped out.  Some had issued 
watered stock in order to raise money fraudulently.  Governments and farmers alike suffered 
as many railroads went through bankruptcy and reorganization.  Id. 
 State governments attacked the rail industry for its bribery of public officials, sale of 
worthless securities, and rate and service discrimination between places and persons.  In 
addition, farmers were left with mortgages, worthless stock, exorbitantly priced or 
nonexistent transportation, and increased taxes needed to cover local government 
investments.  Id. at 261–62.  Midwestern farmers, the primary victims of the rate abuses, 
assailed the excessively high and discriminatory rates that the railroads charged to carry 
agricultural products from points of origin over which carriers had a monopoly to eastern 
markets or processing areas.  They criticized the railroads’ high rates, land grants, and 
political power.  In the meantime, their taxes were increased to cover the parallel investment 
made by their state and local governments.  This led to a blind antagonism toward the 
railroads.  The result was a political movement calling for regulation.  Id. at 262. 
 “The Granger movement is of significance in the evolution of government regulation, 
because it was the first time that American society regulated an industry by setting up a 
regulatory structure outside of the courts and the common law.”  Laurence E. Gesell & 
Martin T. Farris, Antitrust Irrelevance in Air Transportation and the Re-Defining of Price 
Discrimination, 57 J. AIR L. & COM. 173, 175 (1991).  See generally MILLER, supra. 
21. In 1869, Illinois passed the first statute requiring the railroads to offer just, 
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C. Labor Unrest 
The monopoly power wielded by Rockefeller’s Standard Oil led to 
such deep rebates as to result in massive revenue losses by railroads.  In 
1877, Rockefeller insisted that the Pennsylvania Railroad cease oil 
refining or he would divert traffic to other roads.  In the wake of 
Rockefeller’s onslaught, the Pennsylvania fired hundreds of workers, 
slashed wages twenty percent, and doubled the length of trains without 
expanding crews. 
Also that year, the four major eastern railroads—the Pennsylvania, 
New York Central, Erie, and Baltimore and Ohio (B&O)—set up a rate 
control pool and cut wages by ten percent.  After the B&O announced 
wage cuts, a general railroad strike ensued.  Wages had been reduced, 
yet dividends to stockholders were still being paid.  It would be one of 
the bloodiest battles in American labor history, resulting in dozens of 
fatalities.22 
Working conditions on the railroads were onerous.  Workers 
complained of long hours, no overtime pay, the lack of job security, and 
dangerous workplace conditions.23  In 1886, a bloody strike erupted on 
the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad.24  The Brotherhoods began 
 
reasonable, and uniform rates.  See MILLER, supra note 20, at 71–75.  Because state 
legislators had other public business consuming their time, several states established 
commissions to develop expertise in order to adjudicate rate disputes, regulate the intricacies 
of their railroad industry, and protect the public interest in transportation matters.  In the 
west, these state commissions had the power to regulate rail rates, whereas in the east the 
commissions, many of longer vintage, usually had only advisory powers.  See THOMAS K. 
MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 57 (1984).  
22. Trainmen at Martinsburg, West Virginia, refused to handle freight trains; trains 
stopped at Grafton; fights broke out at Wheeling.  To quell the uprising, state governors 
ordered out their militias, which President Rutherford B. Hayes supplemented with federal 
troops.  For a week, nearly the entire railroad system ground to a halt.  Violence broke out in 
Baltimore, Chicago, St. Louis, St. Paul, Omaha, and San Francisco.  In Pittsburgh, a group of 
20,000 strikers and supporters confronted 10,000 militiamen and police; 500 tank cars, 120 
locomotives, and 27 buildings were torched by trade unionists; 24 people died.  Walter P. 
Gray III, Rails West!, in RAILS ACROSS AMERICA: A HISTORY OF RAILROADS IN NORTH 
AMERICA 28, 49 (William L. Withuhn ed., 1993) [hereinafter RAILS ACROSS AMERICA].  
Although the revolt subsided, it inaugurated a new era of labor militancy in American 
industry.  CHERNOW, supra note 5, at 201–02.  It was the first great American industrial 
strike.  Don L. Hofsommer, The Nation’s Arteries, in RAILS ACROSS AMERICA, supra, at 90, 
106. 
23. In 1888 alone, 2,070 railway workers were killed, and another 20,148 were injured.  
In 1894, Eugene V. Debs and the American Railway Union held an unsuccessful strike 
against wage reductions.  BOURNE, supra note 13, at 100, 109. 
24. William G. Mahoney, The Interstate Commerce Commission/Surface Transportation 
Board as Regulator of Labor’s Rights and Deregulator of Railroads’ Obligations: The 
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to amalgamate to form unions, as Congress became convinced that the 
railroads needed regulating.25 
II.  THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 
A.  Creation of the ICC 
Abuses in the railroad industry were not unique to America, and 
neither was regulation.  In Great Britain, advisory powers concerning 
railroads were given to a newly established Board of Trade in 1840.26  In 
1844, a commission was established to report to Parliament on 
applications for railroad charters.  It was clear that competition was not 
effectively regulating traffic and rates.  Yet another commission was 
established in 1846.27  In 1854, the British Parliament passed the Railway 
and Canal Traffic Act to protect local roads and through traffic, secure 
proper facilities, and prohibit discriminatory treatment of shippers.28  
But this proved inadequate.  Parliament would respond again with the 
Act of 1873, which created the Railway and Canal Commission, by 
which the industry was regulated.29  In contrast, Belgium, Prussia, 
France, Austria, Italy, and Canada responded to these concerns by 
nationalizing their railroads.30 
In the United States, it took a bit longer, and socialism would be no 
part of the solution.  The political pressure for regulation of the 
railroads was not just targeted at the states.  The Granger movement 
also had an impact in Washington, D.C.  In 1887, against the backdrop 
of the Wabash decision,31 Congress promulgated the Act to Regulate 
Commerce,32 establishing the nation’s first independent regulatory 
agency—the Interstate Commerce Commission.  The Interstate 
Commerce Act, as it would become known, succinctly established a 
 
Contrived Collision of the Interstate Commerce Act with the Railway Labor Act, 24 TRANSP. 
L.J. 241, 245 (1997). 
25. Hofsommer, supra note 22, at 106. 
26. HADLEY, supra note 5, at 171. 
27. Id. 
28. Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1845, 17 & 18 Vict. C. 31 (Eng.), reprinted in HENRY 
W. DISNEY, THE LAW OF CARRIAGE BY RAILWAY app. at 247 (5th ed. 1921). 
29. RAPER, supra  note 10, at 20–23. 
30. See HADLEY, supra note 5, at 22, 187–235. 
31. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886) (holding that states 
could not regulate interstate rail traffic). 
32. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). 
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comprehensive regulatory regime over the rail industry, some of whose 
important details can be described as follows: 
   
The Act granted the ICC the authority to regulate the interstate 
rates charged by railroads, thereby ensuring that the rates would 
be just and reasonable.  Under the Act, rail carriers could no 
longer discriminate in rates or services between persons, 
localities, or traffic.  Furthermore, they could no longer charge a 
higher rate for a shorter distance that was included within a 
longer haul over the same line in the same direction.  Nor could 
the rail carriers pool freight or revenue.  Most importantly, 
railroads were required to make their rates public, file them with 
the newly formed Commission, and adhere to the published 
tariffs.33 
 
Although the rail-industry witnesses in Congress’s hearings leading 
up to the Act overwhelmingly had favored regulatory legislation, the 
Interstate Commerce Act was still rather effective consumer legislation.  
It included provisions the industry favored (e.g., requirements that rates 
be just and reasonable and that unjust discrimination, preference, and 
prejudice be abolished), but it also included provisions against which the 
railroads had lobbied (e.g., the prohibitions against pooling and against 
charging more for a short haul than a longer haul over the same line in 
the same direction).34 
Never before had Congress established an independent regulatory 
commission to exercise the commerce power conferred under Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution.  President Grover Cleveland appointed 
the distinguished jurist, Thomas Cooley, to the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, and Cooley was elected its first chairman.35 
 
33. Dempsey, supra note 7, at 341 (footnotes omitted). 
34. George Chandler, The Interstate Commerce Commission—The First Twenty-Five 
Years, 16 TRANSP. L.J. 53, 55 (1987). 
35. Cooley, a former Chief Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court, a law professor, and 
author of treatises in constitutional law, torts, and tax, was among the most prolific and gifted 
lawyers in the nation.  Roscoe Pound, for two decades the dean of Harvard Law School, 
considered Cooley one of the top ten judges of all time.  The New York Times referred to him 
as “the father of the Interstate Commerce bill.”  FRANK N. WILNER, COMES NOW THE 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE PRACTITIONER 102 (1993).  Shortly after his appointment to the 
ICC, Cooley recommended creation of an association for state regulatory utility 
commissioners.  This would become the National Association of Regulatory Utility 
Commissions (NARUC), established in 1889.  William R. Childs, State Regulators and 
Pragmatic Federalism in the United States, 1889–1945, 75 BUS. HIST. REV. 701, 706–07 (2001). 
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B.  The Birth of the Modern Regulatory Movement 
The Interstate Commerce Act was the first comprehensive 
regulation of any industry in the United States.36  It was the first time in 
American legal history that an industry was regulated by a structure 
outside the courts and the common law (which had theretofore 
inartfully attempted to prohibit discrimination and abuses by common 
carriers).37  The Interstate Commerce Act preceded the Sherman 
Antitrust Act by three years.  Together, these two pieces of legislation 
formed “the cornerstone of regulation in America,” and from those two 
acts of Congress came “a proliferation of government regulatory 
controls.”38 
Perhaps it was inevitable that government would come to play a role 
in protecting the public and industry from the ravages of economic 
instability and exploitation.  As one commentator remarked, “The 
railroad dominated the U.S. economy and society in the 19th century. 
The domination existed from every standpoint—capitalization, 
employment, community impact or entrepreneurial opportunity.  There 
was no force, industrial or religious, which matched the societal impact 
of the railroad after the first third of the 19th century.”39 
In all events, it is agreed that the creation of the ICC marked the 
birth of economic regulation in America.  To be sure, the precise 
importance can be assessed differently.  Thus, one commentator has 
observed, “The ICC is one of the earliest instances we can point to 
where the federal government intervened directly in the economy to 
 
36. David M. Warner, To Hell on the Railroads: Why Our Technology and Law 
Encourage a Degrading Culture, 26 TRANSP. L.J. 361, 382 (1999). 
37. ROY J. SAMPSON, MARTIN T. FARRIS & DAVID L. SHROCK, DOMESTIC 
TRANSPORTATION: PRACTICE, THEORY, AND POLICY 211–16 (6th ed. 1990). 
38. PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY & LAURENCE E. GESELL, AIR TRANSPORTATION: 
FOUNDATIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 195 (1997).  The intersection of these regulatory 
schemes is explored in another contribution to this collection of essays remembering the 
Interstate Commerce Act, 125 years after its passage.  Randal C. Picker, The Interstate 
Commerce Act and the Sherman Act: Playing Railroad Tycoon, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1135 
(2012). 
39. Joseph Auerbach, The Expansion of ICC Administrative Law Activities, 16 TRANSP. 
L.J. 92 (1987) (expanding on the statement that “[t]he genesis of the public policy [in favor of 
economic regulation] lay in the significance of railroad transportation to the fastest growing 
nation in world history”).  Another has observed that “[w]e know that with the introduction 
of the railway there came a new factor into the life of the nation, and of the world, which 
radically affected all phases of that life.  The railway is both quantitatively and qualitatively 
different from other and earlier means of conveyance and communication.”  1 LEWIS HENRY 
HANEY, A CONGRESSIONAL HISTORY OF RAILWAYS IN THE UNITED STATES 75 (1968). 
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protect the economically weak from the economically strong.”40  
Another has emphasized its more specific legacy, noting this: “From our 
own perspective a century later, the greatest significance of the 1887 Act 
to Regulate Interstate Commerce lies in its creation of the prototypical 
federal regulatory agency.”41  Indeed, in this latter regard, during the 
ensuing decades, the ICC became the model for economic regulation of 
a host of infrastructure industries—and for the numerous federal and 
state agencies that emerged to perform the regulatory function.42 
C.  Restoration and Expansion of Jurisdiction 
To focus on the ICC itself: Although Congress expanded the ICC’s 
jurisdiction in the years after 1887 (giving it jurisdiction over rail safety 
in 1893, for example),43 decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court significantly 
reduced the ability of the nascent commission to regulate rates 
effectively.44  Congress responded by restoring and expanding the 
Commission’s jurisdiction through several Progressive Era reforms 
passed between 1903 and 1910.  In 1903, Congress enacted the Elkins 
Act,45 which prohibited rail rebates and granted the Commission 
authority to impose civil and criminal penalties for intentional acts of 
discrimination and intentional violations of published tariffs.46  Three 
 
40. James C. Miller, III, Keynote Address to ICC Centennial Celebration, 16 TRANSP. 
L.J. 40, 41 (1987). 
41. MCCRAW, supra note 21, at 61–62. 
42. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 1333–34. 
43. Chandler, supra note 34, at 57–58 (discussing the Safety Appliance Act). 
44. For example, in two cases involving the Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific 
Railway, the Court held that the ICC had no authority to prescribe rates for the future. 
Although the Commission could conclude that an existing rate was excessive and unlawful, 
and therefore award reparations to the complaining party, it could not insist on a reduction in 
future rates, which would have protected others similarly situated or the general public.  See 
ICC v. Cincinnati, N.O. & Tex. Pac. Ry., 167 U.S. 479, 511 (1897); Cincinnati, N.O. & Tex. 
Pac. Ry. v. ICC, 162 U.S. 184, 196–97 (1896).  In ICC v. Alabama Midland Railway, 168 U.S. 
144, 173–74 (1897), the Supreme Court effectively deprived the Commission of its ability to 
enforce the long and short-haul provisions of the 1887 statute.  Thus, by the turn of the 
century, an essentially impotent ICC faced increasing rail rates, rail consolidations that were 
reducing competition, and rail carriers that were continuing jointly to fix rates.  
I.L. SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE 32–35 (1931).  Another essay in this symposium 
reflects on these early times for the Commission.  James W. Ely, Jr., The Troubled Beginning 
of the Interstate Commerce Act, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1131 (2012). 
45. Ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847 (1903). 
46. Id. § 1, 32 Stat. at 847–48. 
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years later Congress passed the Hepburn Act,47 giving the Commission 
jurisdiction over express, sleeping-car, and steamship companies, as well 
as over fuel pipelines.48  This Act also conferred on the ICC jurisdiction 
to determine and prescribe maximum rates.49  Additionally, Congress 
gave the Commission the power to establish through-routes and joint 
rates among non-competing carriers and to prescribe their divisions, and 
forbade the issuance of free passes except for clergy.50 
Although the Elkins and Hepburn Acts were designed to prohibit 
rebates, in 1907 the ICC reported that Standard Oil was still “secretly 
accepting rebates, spying on competitors, setting up bogus subsidiaries, 
and engaging in predatory pricing.”51  President Theodore Roosevelt 
and his cabinet were eager for a test case proving Standard Oil’s 
collusion with the railroads.  The company was charged with taking 
rebates from the Chicago and Alton Railroad after the Elkins Act 
prohibited them, and a federal district court issued the largest fine in 
American corporate history up to that time (nearly $30 million).52  While 
this was reduced on appeal, the era of railroad rebates was coming to an 
end.53  Teddy Roosevelt was among the strongest presidential 
proponents of a virile and vigorous Interstate Commerce Commission.54  
Congressional attention continued beyond Roosevelt’s presidency.  
In 1910 Congress passed the Mann–Elkins Act,55 which revitalized the 
Interstate Commerce Act’s long and short-haul provisions56 and 
established new rate procedures.57  Under this Act, the Commission 
could, on its own initiative, suspend tariffs pending an investigation of 
their lawfulness.58  The Act also created a Commerce Court to review 
ICC decisions.59  In 1911, the court reviewed thirty ICC decisions and 
 
47. Ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (1906). 
48. Id. § 1, 34 Stat. at 584. 
49. Id. § 4, 34 Stat. at 589. 
50. Id.; Hofsommer, supra note 22, at 106. 
51. CHERNOW, supra note 5, at 538–39. 
52. Id. at 539–41. 
53. Standard Oil would fall to the antitrust laws and be dismembered in 1911.  Id. at 554. 
54. See DANIELS, supra note 13, at 70–80. 
55. Ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539 (1910). 
56. Id. § 8, 36 Stat. at 547. 
57. Id. § 9, 36 Stat. at 548. 
58. Id. § 13, 36 Stat. at 554. 
59. Id. §§ 1–3, 36 Stat. at 539–42. 
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reversed twenty-seven of them—a reversal rate that led Congress to 
abolish the court in 1913.60   
As war supplies and munitions flowed eastward, gridlock along the 
eastern seaboard led Congress to consolidate the nation’s railroads into 
a single national system supervised by the U.S. government.  At war’s 
end, it was clear that the rail system suffered from duplicative 
overcapacity and deferred maintenance.  After World War I, the policy 
of the federal government shifted from one of protecting the public 
against the market abuses of the transportation industry to one of 
preserving a healthy economic environment for common carriers.  
Congress’s primary action was to promulgate the Transportation Act of 
1920, also known as the Esch–Cummins Act.61 
The new legislation was preoccupied with the financial health of the 
industry.  The ICC was given jurisdiction over minimum rates (to 
supplement its existing authority over maximum rates); power to 
regulate entry and exit from markets (by issuing certificates of public 
convenience and necessity); authority to regulate intercorporate 
relationships, the issuance of securities, and mergers (to ensure a sound 
financial structure); and a mandate to draft a plan for consolidating the 
multiple parallel rail companies into a more efficient and smaller 
number of larger firms.62  But the effort to consolidate the rail system 
died stillborn for lack of support from the industry. 
Title III of the Transportation Act of 1920 also created a new 
agency, the Railroad Labor Board, which attempted to avoid 
interruptions to commerce by negotiating disputes.63  Title III was 
designed to deal with the sometimes-violent confrontations between 
labor and management in the railroad industry (which had included not 
only major strikes in 1877, 1886, 1888, and 1894 but some 105 railroad 
 
60. Chandler, supra note 34, at 57.  During the period from 1889 until World War I, not 
only was the power of the ICC enhanced, but strong regulatory commissions also were 
established in a substantial majority of the states.  DANIELS, supra note 13, at 53.  Other 
legislation also reined in the railroads.  The Panama Canal Act of 1912 prohibited the 
railroads from owning ocean carriers traversing the canal.  The Clayton Act of 1914 
prohibited interlocking railroad directorates.  The Adamson Act of 1916 gave labor the eight-
hour workday.  Id. at 55.  According to Professor Daniels, “By this time the railroad Sam[s]on 
had been rather effectively shorn by the Congressional Delilah.”  Id.  
61. Ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456 (1920). 
62. PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY & WILLIAM E. THOMS, LAW & ECONOMIC 
REGULATION IN TRANSPORTATION 3, 12–13 (1986). 
63. Ch. 91, §§ 304, 307, 41 Stat. at 470–71. 
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strikes between 1899 and 1904).64  A national strike in 1922 revealed that 
the 1920 Act still was not the solution.  So in 1926 Congress 
promulgated the Railway Labor Act,65 the first legislation to force 
management to recognize and bargain with employee representatives.66  
It would later be extended to the airline industry. 
D.  Replication of the Model in the Great Depression 
The Great Depression was the most painful economic period in the 
history of the United States.  It shook to the very core America’s faith in 
laissez-faire.  The Missouri Pacific Railroad became the first railway to 
fall into bankruptcy during this time; by 1939, one-third of the nation’s 
rail mileage was in receivership.67  Congress believed that stability and 
growth of the infrastructure industries—including banking, securities, 
energy, communications, and transportation—were essential if the 
United States was to enjoy national economic recovery.  A sound 
economy could be built on top of a solid infrastructure foundation. 
Hence, during the 1930s, Congress created a number of new federal 
agencies to regulate these important industries, including the Federal 
Power Commission (1930), the Federal Communications Commission 
(1934), the Securities and Exchange Commission (1934), the National 
Labor Relations Board (1935), and the Civil Aeronautics Authority 
(1938), reorganized as the Civil Aeronautics Board (1940).  Most were 
modeled on the first independent federal agency, the Interstate 
Commerce Commission. 
The agencies’ independence was of utmost importance—that is, of 
course, their independence from the Executive Branch.  They were to 
be shielded from the political winds that blow down Pennsylvania 
Avenue by being made relatively autonomous from the White House.  
The independent regulatory commissions were, in a sense, arms of 
Congress, created under its powers to regulate interstate and foreign 
commerce pursuant to Article 1, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. 
 
64. The railroad industry had pressed for the establishment in major cities of Army 
bases, whose soldiers could be called out to quell strikes with force.  Prior legislation, 
including the anemic Arbitration Act of 1888, the Erdman Act of 1898, and the short-lived 
Newlands Act of 1913, had failed to eliminate the conditions that gave rise to strikes. 
65. 44 Stat. 577 (1926). 
66. For an excellent review of this history, see Mahoney, supra note 24, at 245–51. 
67. H. Roger Grant, Hard Times, in RAILS ACROSS AMERICA, supra note 22, at 130, 
130–31. 
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III.  THE ICC AT MID-CENTURY  
A.  Economic Regulation of Motor Carriers 
The early twentieth century had seen the emergence of a new form 
of competition: the motor carrier.68  With the development of a national 
system of highways in the 1920s, motor carriers became an increasingly 
viable competitor to railroads.  The combination of the pneumatic tire, 
the internal-combustion engine, assembly-line production, and hard-
surface roads brought sensational growth to the industry. 
But not all was well.  The industry itself was plagued by its own 
growth.  A driver’s license and a down payment on a truck were all it 
took to get into the industry.  Many entrepreneurs were unsophisticated, 
had little idea what their costs were, and took freight for non-
remunerative prices.  Sometimes they were victimized by shippers with 
monopsony power dictating excessively low rates.  Wages were poor.  
Many firms fell into bankruptcy.  But used-truck dealers simply recycled 
the trucks, and the capacity problems persisted.  Industry overcapacity 
drove trucking rates down to a level that made it impossible for many 
truckers to maintain their equipment, and highway safety suffered.  
All of this led many states to regulate motor carriers, limiting entry 
and requiring that rates be reasonable.  By the mid-1920s, thirty-three 
states regulated motor freight transport, and forty-three regulated bus 
companies.  But the U.S. Supreme Court in 1925 handed down a 
decision that stripped the states of their ability to regulate interstate 
movements.69 
 
68. In 1904, there were but 700 trucks operating in the United States, most powered by 
steam or electrical engines.  The following year, the first scheduled bus service began in New 
York City.  Yet growth of this important means of transport was hampered by poor roads and 
the economic dominance of the railroad industry.  World War I demonstrated the potential 
for motor transport.  Thousands of motor vehicles were produced for the Army; they quickly 
proved their superiority over mules in transporting men and materiel to the front.  After the 
Great War, thousands of surplus Army trucks became the vehicles for growth of the 
commercial motor transport industry.  By 1918, the nation had more than 600,000 trucks.  See 
Dempsey, supra note 10, at 273–74 (and sources cited). 
69. Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925).  In Buck, the State of Washington had 
denied a motor common carrier’s application for operating authority, on the ground that the 
routes were adequately served by four connecting auto stage lines and frequent steam rail 
service.  Dempsey, supra note 7, at 344.  The Supreme Court recognized that safety 
promotion and highway conservation are legitimate reasons for constraining interstate 
transportation, but it concluded that states could not obstruct the entry of motor carriers into 
interstate commerce for purposes of prohibiting competition.  Before Buck, forty states had 
denied the use of their highways to motor carriers operating without certificates of public 
convenience and necessity.  Id. 
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After that, uncontrolled rate wars broke out among interstate 
carriers.  Bankruptcies proliferated.  Safety problems were exacerbated.  
Unscrupulous truckers sometimes stole the freight that had been 
entrusted to them.  Bus companies and brokers occasionally absconded 
with the ticket revenues of unwary passengers.  Fraudulent practices 
became widespread. 
As early as 1926, the U.S. Department of Agriculture issued a report 
concluding that entry and rate stabilization of highway transport would 
be beneficial to prevent over-expansion.70  Beginning that year, 
Congress, in each session, considered bills for economic regulation of 
the motor carrier industry.  Several economists of the day also 
advocated the need for economic regulation.71 
The Wall Street stock market crash of 1929 exacerbated the 
problem.  It set in motion the most prolonged and severe economic 
depression in modern history.  It had a profound impact upon economic 
and political policy in the United States.  The prevailing view soon 
became that the market had failed to serve society’s needs, and failed 
badly.  Only enhanced government involvement in the national 
economy could restore the stability required for economic growth.  With 
3.5 million trucks on the highway, and with thousands of factories 
 
70. W.T. JACKMAN, ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES OF TRANSPORTATION 846–47 (1935). 
71. For example, in 1928, at a meeting of the American Economic Association, William 
M. Duffus declared, “Most students of transportation will agree, I think[,] that there must be 
some sort of central planning looking toward the coordination of our various transportation 
agencies on a sound economic and financial basis.”  JOHN RICHARD FELTON & DALE 
G. ANDERSON, REGULATION AND DEREGULATION OF THE MOTOR CARRIER INDUSTRY 7 
(1989).  Henry R. Trumbower argued that transportation (rail and highway) should be 
considered a regulated monopoly.  Id.  Other economists agreed.  Shan Szto condemned 
excessive competition as of “no benefit to anybody,” making the industry “unattractive to 
responsible business people.”  Id. (quoting Shan Szto, Federal and State Regulation of Motor 
Carrier Rates and Services 13, 24 (1934) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Penn.)).  
Harold G. Moulton and his Brookings Institution associates criticized the waste and 
instability created by excessive competition, and urged comprehensive coordination of 
transportation.  Id. at 8 (citing HAROLD GLENN MOULTON & ASSOCIATES, THE AMERICAN 
TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM 889–90 (1933)).  Professor Paul Kauper noted that “[t]he 
present demoralization of interstate motor transportation, due to unsound competitive 
practices, and the menace of such unrestricted competition to the integrity of the national 
transportation system as a whole create problems that call imperatively for federal 
legislation.”  Paul G. Kauper, State Regulation of Interstate Motor Carriers, 31 MICH. L. REV. 
1097, 1111 (1933); see also Paul G. Kauper, Federal Regulation of Motor Carriers, 33 MICH. L. 
REV. 239 (1934). 
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shutting down, there was less freight to fill empty trucks.  The financial 
health of the industry spiraled downward.72 
With the support of the ICC,73 most of the state public utility 
commissions (PUCs), the truck, bus, and rail industries, and many 
shippers, Congress promulgated the Motor Carrier Act of 1935,74 adding 
bus and trucking companies to the jurisdiction of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission.75  The Act gave the ICC authority over entry 
and rates of motor carriers of passengers and commodities.76  Among the 
purposes of this legislation were the prevention of destructive 
competition among motor carriers and the protection of motor and rail 
carriers from each other.77  Representative Sadowski, a principal 
 
72. Congress first attempted to restore stability by promulgating the National Industrial 
Recovery Act, allowing industries to establish “Codes of Fair Competition” to diminish the 
heated level of competition in an industry.  Such codes were adopted by many industries, 
including motor carriers.  But in 1935, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the legislation on 
constitutional grounds.  A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 
(1935).  Because the Court in 1925 had prohibited the states from regulating interstate motor 
carrier operations, see supra note 69 and accompanying text, such activities would be once 
again unregulated absent further federal legislation.  
73. In 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt appointed the distinguished ICC 
commissioner, Joseph Eastman, to the new position of Federal Coordinator of 
Transportation, with the responsibility to recommend legislation “improving transportation 
conditions throughout the country.”  Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 1933, ch. 91, 
§ 13, 48 Stat. 211, 216 (1933).  The National Association of Railroad and Utility 
Commissioners had sponsored a bill (the “Rayburn Bill”) calling for economic regulation of 
the trucking industry.  The position was quickly endorsed by Eastman and the ICC. 
74. Ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (1935).  This amendment divided the Interstate Commerce Act 
into two parts.  The original Act was designated “Part I.”  The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 was 
then added as “Part II.” 
75. See generally Daniel W. Baker & Raymond A. Greene, Jr., Commercial Zones and 
Terminal Areas: History, Development, Expansion, Deregulation, 10 TRANSP. L.J. 171, 176 
(1978). 
76. Promoting safety also was a principal mandate to the agency.  The new legislation 
gave the ICC power to establish requirements for the qualifications of drivers, maximum 
hours of service, and standards of equipment. 
77. THOMAS D. MORGAN, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS 66–67 (1976).  It was 
feared that a continuation of unrestrained market forces might lead to a loss of service or 
higher prices for small shippers and small communities, leaving the surviving carriers to 
concentrate on high-revenue traffic.  Thus, as Joseph Eastman said, “The most important 
thing, I think, is the prevention of an oversupply of transportation; in other words, an 
oversupply which will sap and weaken the transportation system rather than strengthen it.”  
William E. Thoms, Rollin’ On . . . To a Free Market: Motor Carrier Regulation 1935–1980, 13 
TRANSP. L.J. 43, 48 (1983) (quoting Eastman’s remarks before the Senate Committee on 
Interstate Commerce in 1935).  The concern was expressed that without regulation, the 
economies of scale inherent in the industry would cause concentration, and inevitably, 
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sponsor, described “the purpose of the bill [as] to provide for regulation 
that will foster and develop sound economic conditions in the 
industry.”78  In short, economic stability and enhanced safety were the 
Motor Carrier Act’s major purposes. 
Under economic regulation, the industry grew and prospered.  
Motor carriers became responsible, reliable, and safe enterprises.  
Competition became healthy, with modest government oversight of rate 
levels and entry.  Efficient and well-managed carriers began to earn a 
reasonable return on investment.  The stability of the motor carrier 
industry provided a foundation for national economic recovery. 
B.  The Structure of Economic Regulation 
It is worthwhile to sketch briefly the ICC’s basic approach to 
economic regulation of transportation.  The agency’s work encompassed 
several principal clusters of activities: 
Entry and Exit—The ICC prescribed what routes could be served, 
designating which applicants would be allowed to serve proposed city-
pairs or territories.  Once a carrier served a market, it ordinarily could 
not cease service unless it received governmental approval to exit.  In 
granting either entry or exit, the agency would issue a certificate of 
public convenience and necessity.  Typically, service offerings were also 
regulated in a manner in which carriers were under a common carrier 
obligation to provide adequate service in the territories described by 
their operating certificates.  Finally, carrier safety, financial and 
managerial ability, and compliance disposition were regulated in 
certification proceedings in which the agency was required to find the 
applicant fit, willing, and able to perform the proposed service. 
Rates—The agency had authority to review whether rates in carrier-
filed tariffs were just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory. The agency 
protected the public against the extraction of monopoly rents and 
 
oligopolistic and monopolistic markets.  In short, the destructive potential of excessive 
competition was everywhere apparent.   
 One can dust off the history books of the nineteenth century and find that many of these 
conditions existed in the railroad industry before it was regulated in 1887.  For example, the 
unregulated railroads were beset with fierce price wars in competitive markets while exacting 
highly discriminatory monopoly rates in markets in which they enjoyed market power.  
Destructive competition produced economic anemia, which encouraged consolidations and 
monopolization.  See supra text accompanying notes 4–21. 
78. Baker & Greene, supra note 75, at 178. 
2012]    125 YEARS SINCE THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT 1171 
pricing discrimination.  Efficient and well-managed carriers were 
allowed the opportunity to earn a reasonable return on investment. 
Antitrust—The agency would review proposed carrier mergers, 
acquisitions, and consolidations, interlocking relationships, securities 
issuances, and inter-carrier agreements to determine whether they were 
in the public interest.  Approval generally shielded these arrangements 
from the Sherman and Clayton antitrust acts. 
Consumer Protection—The agency would prohibit unfair and 
deceptive competitive practices, such as false and misleading 
advertising. 
Throughout the twentieth century, most state PUCs regulated the 
intrastate aspects of these industries in essentially the same areas of 
oversight. 
C.  The Interstate Commerce Commission at Its Zenith 
Until the demise of the northeast railroads in the 1970s, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission was regarded as a model of good 
government.  At the agency’s fiftieth anniversary, the ICC was praised 
for its “vigor, spirit, and statesmanlike administration.”79  A leading 
Congressman said of the ICC, “Without desire to aggrandize itself, but 
actuated by what it believe[s] to be in the public interest, free from 
partisanship or politics and resisting pressure from whatever source, it 
does its work.”80 
At the Commission’s seventy-fifth anniversary, Supreme Court 
Justice Felix Frankfurter eloquently summarized the agency’s strengths: 
 
[T]he Commission illustrates, throughout its life, unblemished 
character[—]character meaning a fastidious regard for 
responsibility, a complete divorcement between public and 
private interest, and all other concomitants of a true and worthy 
conception of public duty.  Alas, that cannot be said of all public 
bodies, but it can be said that this Commission throughout its 
seventy-five years has had a career of unblemished character. 
Secondly, . . . we are here to celebrate as striking a 
manifestation of competence in government as any I know of in 
 
79. Clyde B. Aitchison, The Evolution of the Interstate Commerce Act: 1887–1937, 
5 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 289, 321 (1937). 
80. John J. Esch, The Interstate Commerce Commission and Congress—Its Influence on 
Legislation, 5 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 462, 502 (1937). 
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the three branches of government. . . . 
. . . . 
Thirdly, it is a necessary condition, before a Commission can 
effectively act, that it be independent. . . . 
. . . . 
. . .  [The ICC] has maintained not merely formal 
independence, but actual independence of word and deed, and 
has been a laboratory demonstration of how economic problems 
may be worked out by trial and error.  Finally, by virtue of all 
these considerations, the Commission has been a pacemaker, a 
model, for the subsequent commissions which, in turn, have been 
created in response to economic and social demands in their 
fields of activity.81 
 
This era of good feelings would not last.82 
IV.  THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION IN DECLINE 
A.  Railroad Regulatory Reform 
The growth of interstate highways led to a shift of traffic from rail to 
the motor carrier industry.  Coupled with the move of industry out of 
the northeastern “rust belt” into the southeastern and western “sun 
belt,” this led to a decline of railroad profitability.  Yet it was regulation 
that took the blame for the collapse of the northeastern railroads. 
Conrail was formed in 1973 with the merger of the bankrupt Penn 
Central (formerly the Pennsylvania and New York Central railroads) 
and five smaller railroads.83  The bankruptcy of the Penn Central, the 
Rock Island, and, later, the Milwaukee made Congress fearful that the 
government would end up owning, maintaining, and operating the 
nation’s rail system.  As it had earlier bailed out railroad passenger 
service with the creation of Amtrak (and would later bail out the airline 
 
81.  FELIX FRANKFURTER, The Interstate Commerce Commission, in OF LAW AND LIFE 
& OTHER THINGS THAT MATTER: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER, 
1956–1963, at 235, 236–44 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1965).  Justice Frankfurter also 
prophetically foresaw the things that could cause the demise of the ICC.  See Dempsey, supra 
note 6, at 378. 
82. To be sure, there had been dissenting voices along the way.  See, e.g., Samuel 
P. Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public 
Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952). 
83. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Antitrust Law and Policy in Transportation—Monopoly I$ 
the Name of the Game, 21 GA. L. REV. 505, 547 (1987). 
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industry after the catastrophic impact of September 11th), Congress 
stepped in to bail out Conrail with a massive infusion of federal capital. 
By the mid-1970s, the political mood in Washington had shifted 
against economic regulation.  Regulatory failure took much of the 
blame for the anemic state of the rail industry.  In order to restore the 
health of the rail industry, Congress passed the Regional Rail 
Reorganization (3R) Act of 1973,84 the Railroad Revitalization and 
Regulatory Reform (4R) Act of 1976,85 and the Staggers Rail Act of 
1980.86  Collectively, the legislation limited the ICC’s jurisdiction over 
rail ratemaking, circumscribing its ability to regulate rates unless the 
traffic in question was “market dominant.”  Rail exit from unprofitable 
markets also became easier.  Additionally, the legislation partially 
preempted state jurisdiction over rail rates and operations.  The 
Staggers Rail Act reduced the ICC’s jurisdiction over rates.87  Mergers 
and acquisitions became robust in this post-regulatory era.  Whereas in 
1939, 1,323 Class 1 railroads operated in the United States, today there 
are fewer than ten.  In fact, today the United States is dominated by two 
massive western railroads (the Union Pacific and the BNSF) and two 
large eastern railroads (the Norfolk Southern and CSX). 
B.  The Politics of Deregulation 
It should be noted that regulatory reform and deregulation are not 
 
84. Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985 (1974). 
85. Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31 (1976). 
86. Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980). 
87. The Staggers Act authorized ICC jurisdiction over rates only if the traffic was in fact 
market dominant and the proposed rates were more than 170% of variable costs.  Railroads 
were free to raise or lower rates at will unless, with respect to an increase, the carrier had 
market dominance over the traffic or, with respect to a decrease, the rates would be lowered 
below a “reasonable minimum” (in the latter regard, if the rate was above the variable costs 
of providing the service, it was conclusively presumed to contribute to “going concern value” 
and therefore above a reasonable minimum).  Staggers also freed railroads to enter into 
contracts with shippers covering rates and levels of service.  See id. §§ 201–203, 208, 94 Stat. at 
1895, 1898–902, 1908. 
 With the appointment of pro-deregulation commissioners, the ICC defined “market 
dominance” in such a way that it was rarely deemed to exist.  According to the Commission’s 
interpretation, it did not exist if there was intermodal competition, intramodal competition, 
product competition, or geographic competition.  Subsequently, the Commission took the 
position that carriers should be generally free to raise rates until either they became “revenue 
adequate” or “stand-alone costs” were achieved.  Potomac Electric Power Co. v. ICC, 744 
F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  Stand-alone costs are essentially what it might cost an electric 
utility, for example, to lay its own rail line to a coal mine.  Producers of coal and electric 
utilities called for legislative relief from this administrative deregulation. 
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the same thing, although the political movement for the former 
probably served as a catalyst for the latter.  Regulatory reform, as 
originally conceived, consisted of a modest political agenda for 
improvement of the regulatory process. 
It was argued that government had become bloated, fat, and lazy.  
Agencies were headed by political cronies rather than professional 
managers.  Lethargy snuffed out innovation.  The agencies had allegedly 
been “captured” by the industries they regulated.88  Consumer advocate 
Ralph Nader assembled a team of law students who wrote a scathing 
1,200-page critique of the ICC.  That report, The Interstate Commerce 
Omission, described the agency as an elephant’s graveyard of political 
hacks, who enjoyed “deferred bribes” in the form of a “revolving door” 
of subsequent employment in the industry that they regulated.89  
The time and resources expended in complying with the regulatory 
labyrinth were perceived as excessive, as were the costs to taxpayers.90  
Following enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, the 
ICC was the largest employer of administrative law judges.91  Yet the 
ICC was a tiny federal agency, with only five commissioners, eight 
clerks, and two messengers in 1887, growing to eleven commissioners 
and some 2,700 government servants at its high water mark in the 
1940s.92  Contrast that with the U.S. Department of Transportation, 
 
88. In analyzing the motives and behavior of administrative agencies, some 
commentators have suggested that after an initial developmental period, an agency inevitably 
falls captive to the industries it regulates.  See MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING 
BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 294 (1955) (arguing that commissions tend to 
become protective representatives for agencies regulated); James O. Freedman, Crisis and 
Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1041, 1055–56 (1975) (stating that 
regulated groups exert pressure on an administrative agency in proportion to their economic 
importance); Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: 
A Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1954) (concluding that Congress’s failure to provide 
clear statutory standards leads to control of agencies by private groups). 
89. ROBERT C. FELLMETH ET AL., THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION: THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE ICC 20–39, 311 (1970). 
90. Dempsey, supra  note 3, at 26.  The Yak Fat Controversy is an example of what was 
wrong with the excessive procedural morass into which the ICC had degenerated.  Fed up 
with railroad opposition to every trucking rate filed, Robert Hilt II of Hilt Truck Line in 
Omaha, Nebraska, filed a tariff seeking to haul 80,000-pound truckload lots of yak fat from 
Omaha to Chicago at 45 cents per hundred pounds.  A number of railroads objected on 
grounds that the rate was non-compensatory; Hilt’s tariff was suspended pending 
investigation.  In truth, there was not a single yak within 10,000 miles of Omaha—not even in 
zoos.  WILNER, supra note 35, at 151–52. 
91. WILNER, supra note 35, at 98. 
92. See id. at 233; Leonard S. Goodman, Getting Started: Organization, Procedure and 
Initial Business of the ICC in 1887, 16 TRANSP. L.J. 7, 8–16 (1987). 
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which by 1980 had about 115,000 employees.93 
The regulatory reform movement, on the whole, seemed to 
appreciate the important public benefits that government was 
performing, but advanced a belief that the governmental function could 
be performed better, more expeditiously, efficiently, and economically.  
The regulatory reform movement focused largely on means.  It called 
for greater regulatory flexibility to allow the industry to respond to 
market forces. 
In contrast, the deregulation movement focused largely on ends.  
Deregulators wanted the very heart of the regulatory function 
amputated from the body politic, and free-market economists provided 
the intellectual artillery, insisting that transportation firms were not 
public utilities, as they had been commonly perceived.94 
The context is broader.  The generation of Americans who grew up 
during the Great Depression and World War II saw government as an 
essential companion—a mechanism for achieving greater social good, 
protecting the country from threats without and within.  For most of 
these Americans, the Depression shattered confidence in the theory of 
laissez-faire.  The free market had produced the worst economic 
collapse in history; millions of Americans lost their jobs, their homes, 
their self-esteem, and their faith in the philosophy of a free market.  
They turned to government to find a solution.  It was during this era that 
many of the independent regulatory agencies were born. 
But the generation of folks who grew up in the 1960s and 1970s 
emerged cynical, perceiving government to be a malignant sore.  Those 
on the left abhorred Lyndon Johnson’s war in Vietnam and Richard 
Nixon’s Watergate.  Those on the right were offended by the social 
engineering of Johnson’s Great Society and the accompanying larger 
government and higher taxes.  Both converged on a common path that 
viewed government with hostility.  That provided the foundation for a 
bipartisan political movement.95 
During the 1970s and early 1980s, deregulation became a bipartisan 
movement, one that swept America profoundly and provided a new 
 
93. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSPORTATION, 14TH ANNUAL REPORT 47 tbl.2 (1980). 
94. See RICHARD E. CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS: AN INDUSTRY 
STUDY (1962); GEORGE W. DOUGLAS & JAMES C. MILLER III, ECONOMIC REGULATION 
OF DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT: THEORY AND POLICY (1974). 
95. See generally PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES OF DEREGULATION: THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION, at 
xv (1989). 
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order of radically less government intervention in the market.  In 
Congress, liberal Democratic Senator Teddy Kennedy and conservative 
Republican Senator Bob Packwood locked arms in a war with 
transportation regulation.  All fronts were determined to advance 
against regulation.  At the White House, Democratic President Jimmy 
Carter and his successor, Republican President Ronald Reagan, led the 
crusade for significant deregulation of major industries—broadcasting, 
banking, telecommunications, oil and gas, air, rail, bus, and trucking.  
That movement was coupled with deregulation in less-industry-specific 
areas such as antitrust enforcement and environmental, safety, and 
health standards. 
On Capitol Hill, Kennedy fired the opening salvo in hearings on 
airline deregulation that he conducted as chairman of the Senate 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure.96  
These hearings served as the political genesis of congressional reform.  
Coached by law professor (and future Supreme Court Justice) Stephen 
Breyer,97 Kennedy began the hearings by saying, “Regulators all too 
often encourage or approve unreasonably high prices, inadequate 
service, and anticompetitive behavior.  The cost of this regulation is 
always passed on to the consumer.  And that cost is astronomical.”98   
Free-market economists, who for years had attacked the 
phenomenon of economic regulation, provided the intellectual 
justification.  They insisted that government distorted the competitive 
equilibrium, created a misallocation of resources, and was “in bed with” 
or “captured by” the industries it regulated.  The neoclassical market 
economists also argued that the costs of regulation were exorbitant.99  
Thus, they argued, society would be better off if the “dead hand” of 
regulation were amputated and replaced with Adam Smith’s “invisible 
hand,” clearing the way for marginal-cost pricing and textbook levels of 
near-perfect competition in a healthy competitive environment.  The 
 
96. Jurisdictionally, it was an odd thing for a judiciary subcommittee to take up airlines 
or their regulation, for there was an aviation subcommittee already established under the 
Senate Commerce Committee chaired by Howard Cannon. 
97. Kennedy had been persuaded by Breyer, subcommittee counsel, that airline 
regulation was ripe for attack on behalf of consumers.  MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL 
J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 40 (1985).  Breyer had previously been a 
Harvard Law School professor, and the Brookings Institution had published his book calling 
for natural gas deregulation.  STEPHEN G. BREYER & PAUL W. MCAVOY, ENERGY 
REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION 132–34 (1974).   
98. DERTHICK & QUIRK, supra note 97, at 41. 
99. See Dempsey, supra note 3, at 26–29. 
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discipline of economics had not embraced an ideology with such 
religious passion since the Bolshevik Revolution.100  It would snowball 
into an avalanche that swept over nearly all of government. 
The first major step was the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,101 
which would deregulate pricing and entry, and sunset the Civil 
Aeronautics Board in 1985.  As one authority has noted, “Deregulation 
succeeded against industry opposition because it was supported by a 
coalition of academics able to highlight concrete examples of lower fares 
with less regulation, consumer groups, politicians looking for an anti-
inflation or pro-free market issue, public disgust with scandals, and 
charismatic individual spokesmen, all of which excited a media blizzard 
that lasted for several years.”102  This would set the stage for Congress to 
sunset the Interstate Commerce Commission a decade later. 
C.  Regulatory Failure and Deregulation 
Ironically, just as economic regulation was born of market failure, 
during the last quarter of the twentieth century deregulation was born of 
regulatory failure.  After the dust settled from the Great Society, there 
was a widely held perception that government was inefficient, costly, 
and ineffective.103  Much of the momentum for deregulation was born of 
the exasperation of businesses and individuals over what was perceived 
to be an unwieldy and expensive Washington bureaucracy, which tied 
them in red tape.104  The direct and indirect costs of regulation were 
viewed as expensive and inflationary.  The direct costs were felt in the 
tax dollars directly needed to support the agencies and their large staffs.  
But the indirect costs were also large—the armies of lawyers, lobbyists, 
accountants, and expert witnesses needed to satiate the agencies’ 
enormous appetite for paper and endless hearings.  “Regulatory lag” 
not only was costly in terms of the impact of market inflation upon 
obsolete pricing, but it made business decision-making difficult, for the 
regulatory future was uncertain and unpredictable. 
Economist Robert DeFina estimated that for each dollar spent by 
 
100. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Interstate Trucking: The Collision of Textbook Theory and 
Empirical Reality, 20 TRANSP. L.J. 185, 187–89 (1992). 
101. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978). 
102. Michael E. Levine, Essay, Why Weren’t the Airlines Reregulated?, 23 YALE J. ON 
REG. 269, 291 (2006). 
103. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Erosion of the Regulatory Process in Transportation—The 
Winds of Change, 47 ICC PRAC. J. 303, 319 (1980). 
104. Id. 
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government directly to regulate, industry suffered an economic burden 
for compliance of twenty times as much.  Under this hypothesis, 
taxpayers spent $3 billion in 1976 to run the regulatory agencies, while 
industry theoretically spent an additional $60 billion to comply with the 
regulations the agencies imposed.105  Regulatory agencies are headed by 
individuals who are products of a system of political patronage and, like 
academic institutions, staffed by individuals with, some would claim, 
excessive job security—an environment not conducive to productivity or 
efficiency.106 
The point of expense was forcefully made.  Professor Bernard 
Schwartz noted this as one of the two major causes of contemporary 
disillusionment with administrative agencies: 
 
The goal of cheap and inexpensive justice by experts, one of the 
chief reasons for setting up agencies, has proved illusory.  The 
administrative process has too often proved even more 
expensive and time-consuming than the judicial process.  Even 
more important has been the increasing failure of agencies to 
protect that very public interest they were created to serve.  The 
administrative process, which had once been vigorous in fighting 
for the public interest, has become an established part of the 
economic status quo.  It has come to terms with those it is 
ostensibly regulating; the “public interest” is equated more and 
more with the interest of those being regulated.107 
 
Professor William Jones gave as an example the inability (or 
unwillingness) of regulatory agencies to protect the public against 
monopoly abuses.  “In most multi-firm regulated industries,” he wrote, 
“the principal focus of price regulation is not on protecting consumers 
from monopolistic exploitation, but on protecting rivals from vigorous 
pricing competition.”108  Thus, over time, many agencies lost sight of 
 
105. Id. 
106. Like civil-service protection of government employees, tenure of college professors 
seems to have a debilitating effect upon all but the self-motivated.  Post-tenure, too many 
professors crawl into a fetal position or, at any rate, semiretirement, making little 
contribution to education beyond the classroom.  See Michael I. Swygert & Nathaniel 
E. Gozansky, Senior Law Faculty Publication Study: Comparisons of Law School 
Productivity, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 373, 381 & tbl.1 (1985). 
107. BERNARD  SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 26 (2d ed. 1984). 
108. William K. Jones, Government Price Controls and Inflation: A Prognosis Based on 
the Impact of Controls in the Regulated Industries, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 303, 323 (1980). 
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their responsibility to protect the “public” (defined by some as the 
consumer interest), and embraced the policy of facilitating the optimal 
economic interests of the industries that they regulated. 
The direct and indirect costs of regulation were inflationary, and 
created distortions in the marketplace which resulted in a misallocation 
of society’s resources.  The distortions were perverse.  In transportation, 
it was argued that regulation created excessive service and insufficient 
pricing competition (vis-à-vis that which might have existed in the 
absence of regulation).  Railroads earned an inadequate return on 
investment, leading to several carrier failures during the 1970s (the Penn 
Central, Milwaukee, and Rock Island “mighty fine” Line principal 
among them).109  In natural gas, regulation imposed low prices, but 
created massive shortages.  In telecommunications, regulation 
underpriced local service but overpriced long distance.110 
As a consequence, beginning more or less in the 1970s, there was a 
strong bipartisan political movement to free industry from the shackles 
of regulation.  Legislative regulatory reform essentially began in the 
railroad industry with the 3R Act of 1973 and 4R Act of 1974, followed 
by the Staggers Rail Act of 1980.  Airlines followed, with the Air Cargo 
Deregulation Act of 1977,111 the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,112 and 
the Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984,113 which terminated the 
CAB and transferred its remaining responsibilities to the Department of 
Transportation (DOT).114  The Motor Carrier Act of 1980115 and the 
Household Goods Transportation Act of 1980116 reduced federal 
economic regulation of trucking operations.  Congress reshaped 
regulation of the intercity bus industry in the Bus Regulatory Reform 
Act of 1982.117  The Surface Freight Forwarder Deregulation Act of 
1986118 deregulated freight forwarders other than those handling 
household goods.  The Negotiated Rates Act of 1993119 addressed 
 
109. For criticism of railroad regulation and praise of deregulation, see Frank N. Wilner, 
Railroads and the Marketplace, 16 TRANSP. L.J. 291 (1988). 
110. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 19 (1982). 
111. Pub. L. No. 95-163, 91 Stat. 1278 (1977). 
112. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978). 
113. Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703 (1984). 
114. Id. § 3(e), 98 Stat. at 1704. 
115. Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (1980). 
116. Pub. L. No. 96-454, 94 Stat. 2011 (1980). 
117. Pub. L. No. 97-261, 96 Stat. 1102 (1982). 
118. Pub. L. No. 99-521, 100 Stat. 2993 (1986). 
119. Pub. L. No. 103-180, 107 Stat. 2044 (1993). 
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problems arising out of filed-rate regulatory requirements in the 
trucking industry.  The Trucking Industry Regulatory Reform Act of 
1994120 further reduced regulation of the trucking industry. 
These legislative initiatives of Congress were coupled with the 
presidential appointment of a large number of free-market economists 
and deregulation ideologues to the federal agencies.121  The collective 
result was the most comprehensive change in government policy since 
the New Deal, and profoundly in the opposite direction. 
The trucking industry provides an example.  The largest number of 
proceedings before the ICC involved motor carriers, which numerically 
comprised the single most substantial mode of transport subject to ICC 
regulation.122  The regulatory environment for the motor carrier industry 
that preceded the 1980 Act was by no means devoid of competition.  
Indeed, more than 16,000 motor carriers held operating authority from 
the ICC.  Marketplace imperatives of supply and demand largely 
influenced the establishment of rates, although government intervention 
existed to restrain carriers from exploiting monopoly or oligopoly 
market positions or to prohibit larger carriers from employing predatory 
pricing activities to drive their smaller competitors out of business.  The 
market, therefore, provided the basis for the lion’s share of the decisions 
regarding pricing and service, and the government participated only 
occasionally to protect those societal objectives that Congress stated to 
be within the public interest. 
Trucking nonetheless became a focus of the regulatory reform 
campaign in the 1970s.  For instance, retailer Sears, Roebuck & Co. led 
a public relations campaign against the onerous paperwork and costly 
burdens of regulation.  The American Trucking Association was an 
ineffective opponent, having long lost the ability to command attention 
on Capitol Hill. 
After lengthy hearings,123 Congress passed in 1980 both the Motor 
 
120. Pub. L. No. 103-311, 108 Stat. 1683 (1994). 
121. See Paul Dempsey, The Interstate Commerce Commission—Disintegration of an 
American Legal Institution, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1984).  Late ICC Chairman Joseph Eastman 
argued that “[z]ealots, evangelists, and crusaders have their value before an administrative 
tribunal, but not on it.”  Joseph B. Eastman, Twelve Point Primer, 16 TRANSP. L.J. 175, 177 
(1987). 
122. See 94 ICC ANN. REP. 99–100 (1980); 93 ICC ANN. REP. 102–03 (1979); 92 ICC 
ANN. REP. 94–96 (1978); 91 ICC ANN. REP. 101–02 (1977); 90 ICC ANN. REP. 113–14 (1976). 
123. The introduction to the House report provides an insight into the effort Congress 
devoted to this investigation:  
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Carrier Act124 and the Household Goods Transportation Act125 to 
liberalize entry and rates of trucking companies.  Though not intended 
to create deregulation, the new legislation was so interpreted by a highly 
politicized and ideological Interstate Commerce Commission.126 
V.  SUNSET OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 
Throughout much of its history, the ICC was regarded as among the 
most competent and highly respected governmental agencies.  
Presidents traditionally selected commissioners for the ICC almost as 
carefully as they have chosen Justices of the United States Supreme 
Court, emphasizing their competence, integrity, and ability to apply the 
law with skill and reason.127 
Times changed.  As noted above, on the ICC’s fiftieth  anniversary, 
the agency was praised for its vigorous and spirited administration of the 
law and for its prudent, nonpartisan protection of the public interest.128  
Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter heralded the seventy-fifth 
anniversary of the ICC in even more-glowing terms.129  But in 1987, at 
the centennial celebration of the ICC’s existence, many were critical of 
the institution.130  Those favoring regulation were disappointed in the 
 
The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 is the product of over 18 months of continuous study 
of one of the most complex issues ever undertaken by this Committee.  In the last 
1 1/2 years, 16 days of hearings were conducted, with 215 witnesses presenting the 
views of nearly every entity in our society touched by this industry.  On two of those 
days, the Committee’s hearings were held in Chicago jointly with the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation.  In addition, thousands of 
letters from consumers—from beef processor to independent owner-operators—
have been received and considered.  Through this process, Congress has reaffirmed 
its role to control and set policy and guidelines for the conduct of interstate 
commerce. 
HAROLD T. JOHNSON, MOTOR CARRIER ACT OF 1980, H.R. REP. NO. 96-1069, at 1 (2d Sess. 
1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2283, 2283. 
124. Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (1980). 
125. Pub. L. No. 96-454, 94 Stat. 2011 (1980). 
126. Dempsey, supra note 10, at 343; Paul Stephen Dempsey, Congressional Intent and 
Agency Discretion—Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 58 CHI.–
KENT L. REV. 1, 17 (1981). 
127. See Aitchison, supra note 79, at 401 (concluding that the ICC has promoted equal 
justice and improvement of general welfare); Oren Harris, The Commissioners, 31 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 309 (1962) (lauding the excellent work of ICC commissioners over seventy-
five-year period). 
128. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.   
129. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.  
130. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 40; Robert S. Burk, The Interstate Commerce 
Commission—The Last Twenty-Five Years, 16 TRANSP. L.J. 76 (1987). 
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ICC’s unwillingness to follow its statutory mandates.  Those favoring 
deregulation felt that the ICC had not gone far enough. 
Changes in the agency’s membership had a substantial effect.  
Although Congress designated the ICC to be an eleven-member body, 
by the mid-1970s presidents were appointing no more than seven 
members.  The large size of the Commission traditionally had 
contributed to its conservatism; policy change within the Commission 
rarely had been radical.  By appointing individuals dedicated to radical 
change and by keeping the Commission’s membership small, however, 
the White House quickly and dynamically shifted the Commission’s 
internal policy to one enthusiastically dedicated to deregulation. 
Before 1967, the president appointed the commissioners, who in turn 
elected the ICC’s chairperson from among their members.  In order to 
deal with criticism of “capture,” Congress during the Nixon 
administration empowered the president to designate which 
commissioner would serve as chairperson.131  This authority sharply 
increased presidential influence over the Commission and its chief 
officer and undermined the ICC’s traditional autonomy from the 
executive branch.132  The increase in presidential power over the 
regulatory agencies did not end the pernicious influence of the 
“revolving door” of senior administrators moving to industry.  President 
Carter’s deregulatory Civil Aeronautics Board Chairman, Alfred Kahn, 
and his principal CAB lieutenants, Phil Bakes and Michael Levine, all 
 
131. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1969, 83 Stat. 859 (1969). 
132. Congress can delegate the power to regulate commerce in a manner that enhances 
or diminishes presidential influence.  There are at least four models of delegation: delegation 
directly to the president, see Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 690–97 (1892); delegation to an 
executive branch agency, see United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 521–23 (1911); 
delegation to an independent regulatory commission subject to presidential review, see 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 107, at 9–15; and delegation to an independent regulatory 
commission without presidential review, see id.  By choosing the last approach in creating the 
ICC, Congress intended to minimize presidential influence over the agency.  See Humphrey’s 
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624–26 (1935) (Congress’s purpose in creating 
regulatory agencies independent of executive authority was to free agencies to exercise their 
judgment without hindrance); see also Freedman, supra note 88, at 1060–61 (insulation of 
administrative agencies from executive branch ensures integrity of administrative process); 
Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 
80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 963–70 (1980) (Congress has power to restrain executive control 
over agency policymaking).  But see Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the 
Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395, 1410–11 (1975) (noting redeeming reasons to justify 
presidential intervention in regulatory process); Verkuil, supra, at 956–58 (arguing that 
presidential power to control, coordinate, and guide policymaking is a means of holding 
agencies accountable). 
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ended up involved in Frank Lorenzo’s Texas Air empire: Kahn on the 
board of New York Air, Levine as an executive there (later going on to 
a senior position at Northwest Airlines), and Bakes as an executive at 
Eastern Airlines.  Carter’s ICC chairman, Darius Gaskins, later became 
CEO of the Union Pacific Railroad.  So the dilution of the 
independence of the ICC from the executive branch did little to stem 
the regulated industry’s capture of the regulator. 
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was a deliberate attempt by 
the executive branch to give this quasi-judicial agency an ideological 
mission by means of the appointment process.  For example, President 
Carter filled vacant seats on the Commission with individuals fervently 
dedicated to deregulation, as did his successor, President Reagan.133  
Relatedly, alleging political patronage in the appointment process, some 
observers criticized the quality of presidential appointments to the 
ICC.134 
Presidents Carter and Reagan accomplished comprehensive 
deregulation even in the absence of statutory authority.  White House 
influence in the ICC, as reflected in ICC endorsement of presidential 
policy, reached its highest level in the agency’s history.135 
 
133. One prominent Washington, D.C. attorney observed that “the Commission became 
highly politicized during the Carter Administration.”  Lawyer Blames Political Ideologues for 
Commission’s Regulatory Failures, TRAFFIC WORLD, May 24, 1982, at 34, 34–35.  President 
Carter appointed Chairman Darius Gaskins, Jr., and Commissioners Marcus Alexis and Tad 
Trantum, who were referred to by some as the “Three Marketeers.”  Although the Ford 
appointees had moved moderately in the direction of liberalized entry and ratemaking, their 
deregulatory efforts paled in comparison to the vigorous efforts of the Carter economists.  
President Reagan continued this trend with the appointment of his own deregulation 
ideologues.  Reagan appointed Frederic N. Andre, Malcolm M.B. Sterrett, and Heather 
J. Gradison to the ICC.  “Newcomers” Now Dominant as ICC Members, TRAFFIC WORLD, 
Jan. 10, 1983, at 16, 17. 
134. See FELLMETH ET AL., supra note 89, at 1 (political connections and political party 
are two important qualifications for commissioners); see also ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, The 
Regulatory Appointments Process, in 1 STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, S. DOC. NO. 95-
25, at xxxi (1st Sess. 1977) (“[N]either the White House nor Senate has demonstrated a 
sustained commitment to high quality regulatory appointments.”). 
135. See ERNEST GELLHORN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., REGULATED INDUSTRIES 382 
(1982) (arguing that catalyst for transportation deregulation originated in the executive 
branch, not the legislative).  The White House became the dominant political force 
influencing ICC policy.  See Verkuil, supra note 132, at 944–47 (discussing Carter 
administration’s confrontations with agency policymakers).  Dean Verkuil noted that 
“[h]ighly charged White House intervention poses a danger of frustrating the will of Congress 
as expressed in legislation establishing an agency and defining its mission.”  Id. at 949–50; see 
also Don Byrne, ICC Chairman Taylor Again Displays Depth of Rift Between Commissioners, 
TRAFFIC WORLD, Apr. 16, 1984, at 46, 47 (ICC no longer heeds congressional mandate but 
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In all events, the ICC moved resolutely toward deregulation.  By 
1979, the ICC was granting ninety-eight percent of the applications filed 
for motor carrier operating authority.136  The Commission supplemented 
its efforts to open the floodgates of entry and to deregulate ratemaking 
with numerous other decisions and rulemakings.137 
 
follows executive policy).  With the Commission dominated by the deregulatory policy of the 
executive branch and with Congress split on the wisdom of deregulation, the remaining check 
on aberrant ICC action was the judiciary.  See Dempsey, supra note 126, at 55 (discussing 
judiciary’s role in overseeing ICC).  Litigants frequently and successfully used the judicial 
forum to challenge the Commission’s actions.  Many federal courts of appeals concluded that 
the ICC’s actions in the area of motor carrier deregulation were inconsistent with its statutory 
obligations.  One court recognized that the Commission’s actions were de facto deregulation 
despite the absence of statutory authority.  Argo–Collier Truck Lines Corp. v. United States, 
611 F.2d 149 (6th Cir. 1979).  Noting the ICC’s tendency to ignore the burden of proof by 
resolving doubts in favor of an applicant for common carrier status, the court announced its 
suspicion that the ICC was disregarding congressional intent by making decisions solely for 
the purpose of increasing competition.  Id. at 155 (ICC’s conclusions not supported by 
substantial evidence or legislative intent). 
 The ICC in the late 1970s was abdicating its responsibility to engage in meaningful rate 
and entry regulation.  See Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Experience of Deregulation: Erosion of 
the Common Carrier System, 13 TRANSP. L. INST. 121, 136–137 (1980).  Reviewing the 
Commission’s actions, courts found the ICC’s decisions to be without an apparent legal or 
factual basis.  See, e.g., Humboldt Express, Inc. v. ICC, 567 F.2d 1134, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(remanding after finding no information in administrative record that indicated basis of 
decision to transfer operating authority from one carrier to another); Pitre Bros. Transfer, 
Inc. v. United States, 580 F.2d 140, 143–44 (5th Cir. 1978) (remanding because of ICC’s 
failure to address petitioner’s arguments); Campbell Sixty-Six Express, Inc. v. ICC, 603 F.2d 
1012, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (remanding decision to ICC because of lack of rational 
connection between findings and decision).  They found it necessary to remind the ICC that 
Congress’s decision to enter into comprehensive regulation contravened the ICC’s apparent 
belief that national policy unqualifiedly favors competition.  See Trans-Am. Van Serv. v. 
United States, 421 F. Supp. 308, 323 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (noting congressional mandate that ICC 
must determine those cases in which grant of operating authority will serve public 
convenience and necessity) (citing FCC v. RCA Communications, 346 U.S. 86, 91 (1953)). 
136. See James W. Freeman & Robert W. Gerson, Motor Carrier Operating Rights 
Proceedings—How Do I Lose Thee?, 11 TRANSP. L.J. 13, 15 n.3 (1979) (providing statistics of 
percentage of applications for operating authority that ICC approved from 1975 until 1979); 
see also Dempsey, supra note 126, at 17 (discussing liberal regulatory policies of ICC during 
late 1970s).   
137. See, e.g., Arrow Transp. Co. v. Extension-Boise, Idaho, 131 M.C.C. 941 (1980) 
(increasing burden on party opposing grant of new entry to show that such entry would have 
deleterious effect on opposing party’s overall operations); Change of Policy Consideration of 
Rates in Operating Rights Application Proceedings, 359 I.C.C. 613 (1979) (easing ICC policy 
by suggesting acceptance of applications that promised lower rates to shippers); Policy 
Statement on Motor Carrier Regulation, 44 Fed. Reg. 60,296, 60,298 (1979) (emphasizing 
need for new competition and not protection of existing carriers); see also Dempsey, supra 
note 126, at 14–21 (discussing ICC’s deregulatory decisions); Freeman & Gerson, supra 136, 
at 63–64 (questioning whether ICC’s relaxed standards were better, cheaper, or more efficient 
than previous standards). 
2012]    125 YEARS SINCE THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT 1185 
The rhetoric of deregulation, however, outpaced the law.  Although 
pro-deregulation Commissioners urged pricing deregulation, the statute 
required that all rates be included in tariffs filed with the ICC and that 
carriers could not lawfully deviate from their filed rates.138  The result 
was that motor carriers were wildly discounting their rates, not filing the 
discounts with the ICC, and dropping into bankruptcy.  Trustees in 
bankruptcy began to file to recapture the difference between the 
amount charged and billed and the amount specified in the ICC-filed 
tariff, pursuant to the “filed rate doctrine.”  Billions of dollars were 
sought from shippers.  Congressional dissatisfaction with the anomaly of 
de facto deregulation and de jure regulation was a catalyst for 
eliminating the tariff-filing requirement in 1994.139   
The ICC Termination Act of 1995140 then sunset the Interstate 
Commerce Commission itself, deregulated and amended certain of the 
agency’s functions, and transferred jurisdiction over rail, motor, bus, 
broker, freight forwarder, and pipeline services to the newly created 
Surface Transportation Board (STB) and the DOT.141  Jurisdiction over 
motor carriers, water carriers, brokers, and freight forwarders is now 
vested in the Office of the Secretary of Transportation, and the states 
are preempted from certain intrastate regulation of motor carriers.142  
The STB is a three-member independent panel within the U.S. 
Department of Transportation.143  It is essentially a railroad regulatory 
agency—as had been the original ICC. 
CONCLUSION 
The transportation industry has undergone a remarkable 
metamorphosis—from horses and wagons, to steamships, to railroads, to 
trucks and automobiles, to aircraft and space craft—a transformation 
that is far from over. The evolution of technology, of America’s 
economy, and indeed, of economic theory and political ideology all has 
 
138. See DEMPSEY & THOMS, supra note 62, at 168. 
139. For a reflection on the detariffing movements in transportation and telephony and 
some of its challenges, see the foreword to this set of articles marking the 125th anniversary of 
the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act.  Joseph D. Kearney, The Last Assembly of 
Interstate Commerce Act Lawyers, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1123 (2012).  
140. Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (1995). 
141. Id. §§ 101, 102, 201, 109 Stat. at 804–07, 932 (codified in part as amended at 49 
U.S.C. §§ 701, 10102(1), 10501 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). 
142. Id. § 103, 109 Stat. at 859, 865, 884 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 13501, 
13521, 13531, 13904 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). 
143. Id. § 201, 109 Stat. at 932 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 701(b) (2006)). 
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contributed to the relationship between government and this important 
infrastructure industry, one which today accounts for approximately 
sixteen percent of the gross national product. 
Few industries play as broad or vital a role in the economy as 
transportation. Throughout American history, a network of roads, 
canals, railroads, and airways has spurred growth by making possible the 
movement of goods from one market to another.  Transportation has 
historically been identified as an industry “affected with a public 
interest.”144  The common carrier obligation—the principle that service 
be open to all upon reasonable request and on fair and 
nondiscriminatory terms—has been imposed upon commercial 
transportation providers since the Middle Ages.  So regulatory oversight 
of the surface transportation industry has long been considered 
necessary and justified to protect the public’s interest in having 
adequate transportation available on reasonable terms. 
More affirmatively, perhaps, federal, state, and local governments in 
the United States have a long history of building, financing, subsidizing, 
and promoting transportation.  The land grants and government 
subsidies helped build the railroads; the nationalization of rail passenger 
service helped restore the health of the freight railroads.  Government 
carries the mail.  It builds the roads, highways, transit lines, airports, and 
seaports. It does all this because it understands the profound positive 
social and economic externalities that transportation potentially offers.  
Whenever possible, the provision of transportation services in the 
United States has been left to private firms (a/k/a common carriers).  
When it has not been economically feasible, as with airports, air traffic 
control and the airways, urban transit, small community air service, and 
intercity passenger rail service, the government has assumed 
responsibility; that is, federal, state, and local governments have 
subsidized or provided these services. 
Across this time (or since 1887, at any rate), federal regulation of the 
transportation sector of the United States’ economy has served various 
purposes: to remedy market deficiencies (such as the lack of effective 
competition or the existence of destructive competition), to override the 
market to achieve broader social purposes, and to ensure uniformity in 
the face of regulatory efforts by the states.  These purposes and the 
manner in which regulation has been implemented to achieve them 
affect not only the performance of the companies and industries in this 
 
144. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126, 130 (1877) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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sector, but also the ability of the United States to lead the global 
economy. 
In 1887, Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act to protect 
the shipping public from the monopoly power of the rail industry, and 
created the Interstate Commerce Commission to carry out that 
regulatory charge.  In 1935, the Commission’s regulatory authority was 
extended to include the nascent interstate trucking and bus operations.  
Other sectors of surface transportation—pipelines, domestic water 
carriers, and freight forwarders—were subjected to economic regulation 
in 1910, 1940, and 1942, respectively.  Airlines were regulated in the 
same fashion beginning in 1938.  Federal economic regulation of 
transportation developed into a comprehensive web of governmental 
oversight of entry and exit, rates, consolidations, and service quality.  
Regulation reached its high water mark in the 1950s and 1960s. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Congress began to pare and refine 
federal transportation regulation to reflect contemporary industry 
conditions and evolving ideological attitudes.  The result was to reduce 
significantly the federal presence in the interstate transportation 
industry.  Perceived successes in transportation deregulation became the 
political catalyst for comprehensive deregulation across many 
infrastructure industry sectors. 
Today, railroads have consolidated into four major lines; the bus 
industry has one large survivor; and several hundred airlines and 
trucking companies have gone bankrupt.  Ironically, the only major 
airline to support deregulation, United Airlines, ended up in the largest 
bankruptcy in aviation history.  Former American Airlines CEO Bob 
Crandall observed: 
 
Our airlines, once world leaders, are now laggards in every 
category, including fleet age, service quality and international 
reputation. 
 . . .  [T]he financial health of the industry, and of the 
individual carriers, has become ever more precarious.  Most 
have been through the bankruptcy process at least once, and 
some have passed through on multiple occasions. 
 . . . . 
 I feel little need to argue that deregulation has worked 
poorly in the airline industry.  Three decades of deregulation 
have demonstrated that airlines have special characteristics 
incompatible with a completely unregulated environment.  To 
put things bluntly, experience has established that market forces 
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alone cannot and will not produce a satisfactory airline industry, 
which clearly needs some help to solve its pricing, cost and 
operating problems.145 
 
The effects have been widespread.  Deregulation of the power 
industry unleashed Enron to wreak havoc on consumers and investors.146  
Deregulation of the telecommunications industry has led to financial 
instability.147  Deregulation of the financial industry resulted in a trillion-
dollar bailout of the savings and loan industry, followed years later by 
the subprime mortgage crisis, which resulted in the housing industry 
meltdown and several trillions more in taxpayer liability in propping up 
the largely deregulated banking and financial industry. 
The cumulative weight of these events triggered the most serious 
economic collapse in American history since the Great Depression, 
saddling our generation and the next with unprecedented debt.  
Deregulation of trade has transformed the United States, the wealthiest 
nation on the planet, into a debtor nation, in which middle-class 
industrial jobs have located offshore, leaving Americans to retrain as 
greeters in Wal-Mart, full of goods produced abroad.  The economists 
tell us this is beneficial for “consumer welfare,” irrespective of the fact 
that a consumer needs a job to buy the cheap imported goods.  It is said 
of economists that they know the price of everything and the value of 
nothing.  They have led this stampede toward free and unregulated 
markets, and working-class Americans pay the price for their myopic 
adventurism.   
Despite the economic crisis of contemporary America, the 
politicians and the public remain in denial that deregulation had 
anything to do with the disintegration of the American economy.  This is 
perhaps because, unlike the 1930s, the collapse of the twenty-first 
century did not result in the collapse of the banking industry, leaving the 
 
145. Robert L. Crandall, Remarks at The Wings Club, in New York (June 10, 2008), 
available at http://www.wingsclub.org/eventspeeches_2008-06.html. 
146. “The collapse of Enron Corporation, the criminal indictment of its auditor Arthur 
Andersen, the bankruptcy of Pacific Gas and Electric Company, and the rolling blackouts 
and price spikes of the California energy crisis of 2000–2001 all have one thing in common: 
They were caused by legislative and administrative failures to design regulatory institutions 
that adequately constrained opportunistic behavior.”  Timothy P. Duane, Regulation’s 
Rationale: Learning from the California Energy Crisis, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 471, 472–73 
(2002) (footnotes omitted). 
147. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Adam Smith Assaults Ma Bell with His Invisible Hands:  
Divestiture, Deregulation, and the Need for a New Telecommunications Policy, 11 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 588, 588–91 (1989). 
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country penniless and unemployed.  Today, instead, the banks are 
solvent, subprime housing has been repossessed, and the American 
economy has been transformed into lower-paying service-sector jobs.  
America remains in this trap so long as the prevailing wisdom is that 
market can do no wrong and government can do no good.  We have not 
learned from the wisdom of George Santayana: those who forget the 
lessons of history are doomed to repeat it.  Judge Richard Cudahy has 
observed: 
 
Economic activity and its political analogues are inherently 
cyclical, and regulatory institutions must be attuned to the 
cyclical nature of things.  A good deal of the time, competition 
advances innovation and growth, but there is indeed sometimes 
such a thing as destructive competition.  We have apparently 
known destructive competition, linked to predatory pricing, in 
the airline industry and may continue to know it.  Competition in 
this industry has been destructive because on balance wealth has 
been destroyed and both tangible and intangible values have 
been undermined.  Competition itself has been weakened, and 
for that reason a return to some form of regulation is likely.148 
 
In the nineteenth century, market failure gave birth to transport 
regulation.  The public interest in transportation was deemed 
paramount.  Nearly a century after economic regulation was born, an 
inflationary economy, coupled with a perceived failure of the regulatory 
mechanism, gave birth to deregulation.  Undoubtedly, the pendulum of 
American public policy will swing again.  Like transportation itself, 
public policy in this vital infrastructure industry is in perpetual motion. 
 
 
148. Richard D. Cudahy, The Coming Demise of Deregulation, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 15 
(1993). 
